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Abstract 
The Privacy Act came into force on 1 July 1993. The first part of this paper surveys areas that raise privacy issues in 
the workplace. These relate in particular to the collection and use of employee information for selection, evaluation, 
monitoring, surveillance, and testing purposes. The second part of this paper discusses the nature of the Privacy Act, 
and its effect on the workplace. 
The coming into force of the Privacy Act on 1 July 1993 
affected nearly every area of daily life in New Zealand. 
none more so than the w<rtplace. The first part of this 
paper briefly surveys the principal areas that raise privacy 
issues in the workplace. The second part of this paper 
discusses the impact of the Privacy Act on the workplace. 
At the s~ it is important to draw attention to the nature 
of the concept of privacy, particularly in relation to the 
workplace. 'Privacy' is not a precise technical legal or 
philosophical tenn. nor does it denote a quality that has an 
absolute value on its own. Rather, it is a compendious 
exptessioo that is capable of embracing a variety of inter-
ests in relation to the individual, and its value usually 
depends on the context and circumstances in question. 
Privacy has been described as, "a broad value, represent-
ing concemsaboutautonomy, individuality, personal space, 
solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and a host of related con-
cerns ... 1 In regard to the workplace. these related concerns 
include the protection of one· s reputation and the confi-
dentiality of one's sensitive personal information. In 
general, workplace privacy interests have been said to 
arise from the following: 
1. Employee's person, pmperty, or private conversa-
tions; 
2. Employee's private life or beliefs; 
3. Use of irrelevan~ inaccurate, or incomplete facts to 
make employment decisions; and 
4. Disclosure of employment information to third par-
ties.2 
It is also important to note at the outset that a focus on 
privacy in the workplace may somewhat arbitrarily single 
out only one aspect of what actually may be a multifaceted 
issue. Privacy issues often raise concerns in relation to 
other workplace matters, such as worker health and stress, 
workpJace safety, worker dignity. working conditions, and 
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discrimination. For example, workers in the most heavily 
monitored industries, such as airline reservations, 
telemarketing, and wordprocessing, are predominantly 
women, so that privacy concerns in these areas also raise 
gender issues. 
Privacy issues in the work place 
The post-war international human rights commwrity has 
repeatedly affirmed that individuals have an interest in 
some measure of control over the dissemination and use of 
information about themselves, and in enjoying freedom 
from unreasonable intrusion into their personal affairs. 
The existence of such privacy interests is especially rel-
evant to institutional settings such as the employment 
contex~ where the job applicant or employee is in a 
position of relative weakness in comparison to those who 
would collect and use personal information. While the 
individual may in law consent to the intrusion. it is only 
because the individual is not really in a position to refuse 
consent 
Thus, the basis for much of the concern about the privacy 
of employees in the workplace lies in their inherent pow-
erlessness to assert their privacy interests, and in the 
traditional disinterest and weakness of the law in compen-
sating for this lack of power in the employment relation-
ship. The Australian Law Reform Commission, for exam-
ple, has commented: 
An intrusive interference with the person is not tortious 
where consent has been obtained. Consent in certain 
settings, while it might appear to have been voluntary, 
will very often not be real. The weaker party, whether a 
shopper, employee, applicant for employment, or insti-
tutionalised person, will often not be in a position to deny 
a request to search property or person. Consent may be 
an appropriate bar to an action for assault, but it is not 
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necessarily a bar to the invasion of privacy, especially in 
relationships of unequal power. When the search is on 
the investigator's property, such as a search by an 
employer or institution of a locker or desk drawer, the 
law is of no assistance to the person whose privacy has 
been invaded. 3 
Employer interest in employee information began to grow 
significantly in the early twentieth century, when it was 
fostered by the 'scientific management' school of thought 
that sought to maximise the efficiency of the 'human 
machine'. In 1912, for example, Frederick W Taylor 
stated that 
It becomes the duty of those on the management's side 
to deliberately study the character, the nature and the 
performance of each workman with a view to finding out 
his limitations on the one hand, but even more important, 
his possibilities for development on the other hand. .. 4 
The scientific approach to the workplace encouraged em-
ployers to become personally interested in the welfare of 
their workers. The Ford Motor Company was among the 
first to send inspectors to investigate the personal lives of 
its workers. The object here was not only to enhance 
production, but also to undermine the need for unions. The 
scientific approach continued to grow in influence after the 
First World War with the rise of the specialist field of 
industrial psychology, which had its immediate roots in 
the United States Army's institution of intelligence tests 
during the war. 
Although management theories have come and gone, 
employers continue to rely on the systematic collection 
and use of information about employees in the running of 
their enterprises. The earlier, partly benign motive for 
collecting employee information, however, appears to 
have disappeared. As the workforce becomes more 
mobile and standards of living have improved~ there per-
haps no longer appears to be a need for employers to evince 
an interest in their workers' welfare. 
While increased government regulation over the years has 
had a role in increasing the amount of information col-
lected by employers, their collection of information is still 
largely carried out for enabling better control over their 
enterprises and the efficient use of resources, both human 
and non-human. 
In the early twentieth century, technology began to be 
harnessed to aid employers' collection of information. 
For example, mechanisms were devised that could be 
connected to manual typewriters in order to count the 
number of keystrokes or carriage retmns. Technological 
advances since then have greatly enhanced employers' 
ability to collect and use information. Information today 
can be collected in more personally intrusive ways than 
could ever have been imagined. and vast quantities of 
information can be easily stored and accessed. 
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In the past two decades in particular, the surveillance, 
monitoring, and testing of employees has become an 
increasingly accessible option for most employers. The 
Office of Technology Assessment in the United States has 
classified aspects of employee behavior that are subject to 
such activities into three broad overlapping categories: ( 1) 
employee performance, which may be monitored in rela-
tion to output (keystrokes, items handled), use of resources 
(computer time, call accounting, searches), and contents of 
communications (telephone monitoring, accessing elec-
tronic mail or other correspondence, listening devices); 
(2) employee behavior, which overlaps with employee 
performance, and may be monitored in relation to location 
(cards, beepers, TV cameras), activities (TV cameras), 
concentration and mental activity (brainwave), and predis-
position to error (drug testing); and (3) personal charac-
teristics, which overlaps with employee behavior and 
performance, and which may include monitoring or testing 
in relation to employee predisposition to health risk (ge-
netic screening, pregnancy testing), and employee truth-
fulness and overall character (polygraph, brainwave, psy-
chological tests).5 
The future holds in store yet more sophisticated means of 
monitoring. One system being developed by the United 
States military, IDES (Intrusion Detection Expert Sys-
tem), combines artificial intelligence with employee moni-
toring. Although developed for security purposes, it has 
obvious uses in the workplace for detecting changing or 
unusual behaviour. The system matches the user's actual 
activity with known historical patterns in order to detect 
anomalies, which would indicate suspicious activity or 
deteriorating performance. The system is able to alert the 
supervisor's terminal, or compile a record of instances of 
such anomalous behavior. 
The Privacy Act 1993 
In its application to the workplace, the Privacy Act did not 
suddenly introduce rules into an area where before there 
were none. Nevertheless, the Privacy Act has significantly 
altered or supplemented law in the workplace. 
As human rights legislation. the Privacy Act compensates 
somewhat for the imbalance in power that normally forms 
a backdrop to the collection by employers and employ-
ment agencies of personal information from job applicants 
and employees. Information privacy principle 1 ins 6 of 
the Privacy Act only permits the collection of personal 
information if it is collected for a lawful pwpose connected 
with a function or activity of the agency. and if it is 
necessary for that purpose. 
For example, a job applicant should not be asked to provide 
personal information that is irrelevant to the position that 
is to be filled. Principle 1 supplements existing pre-
employment anti-<liscrimination law. now to be found in 
Part II of the Human Rights Act 1993, which deals with 
acting on the basis of particular prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. In particular, s 23 of the Human Rights Act 
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mates it unlawful "to use <r circulate any fmn of applica-
tion for employment or to make any inquiry of or about any 
applicant for employment" that suggests that a decision 
will be made on the basis of a prohibited ground of 
discrimination. The Privacy Act thus overlaps with the 
Human Rights Act to the extent that both are concerned 
with the awropriateness of the information that goes into 
a decision whether or not to employ an individual. 
The nature of the relationship between the Privacy Act and 
the Human Rights Act is illwninated by the OECD collec-
tion limitation principle (para 7 of the OECD Council 
Recommendation Concerning Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder flows of Personal 
Data). The OECD Expert Group, which drew up the 
Guidelines, was of the view that there ought to be 
limits to the collection of data which, because of the 
manner in which they are to be processed, their nature, 
the context in which they are to be used or other 
cicumstances, are regarded as specially sensitive.6 
Although the Expert Group discussed various 'sensitivity 
criteria', such as the likelihood of personal information 
being used in a discriminatory way, it was unable to agree 
upon those classes of personal infonnation '~hich are 
universally regarded as sensitive" (para 51). Accordingly, 
the OECD Guidelines leave it to individual states to set 
limits on the indiscriminate collection of personal data, 
allowing each country to fonmdate its own limits. Among 
the suggested types of limits that may be set on the 
collection of personal data are those that relate to civil 
rights concerns. The Human Rights Act may therefore be 
viewed in part as legislation that fulfills one of the aims of 
the OECD collection limitation principle. 
The Privacy Act also imposes upon employers certain 
obligations in connection with the provision and collection 
of references or testimonials. At common law, there is no 
obligation on an employer or former employer to provide 
a reference or respond to inquiries about a job applicant: 
Gal/ear v J F Watson & Son Ltd [1979] IRLR 306. Only 
recently has a court found that an employer who provides 
an inaccmate reference can be liable in negligence to the 
employee about whom it is written: Spring v Guardian 
Assurance PLC and Ors [1994] 3 WLR 354 {UK, HL). 
Traditionally this area was governed by the tort of defama-
tion (actions in deceit or negligence, however, would still 
be able to be pursued by the employer who is misled by an 
inaccurate reference). Since references would be subject 
to qualified privilege, the protection against liability for 
defamation can be lost only where malice by the provider 
of the reference is shown. 
Under the Privacy Act, however, a person normally may 
only supply a referenc.e if there is a reasonable belief that 
it has been authorised by the individual concerned (princi-
ple 11). Moreover, personal information that was obtained 
for one purpose (for example, the original job application 
or an in-house performance assessment) should not be able 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
to be used for another purpose (i.e., providing a job 
reference) unless it is reasonably believed that this has 
been authorised by the individual concerned (principle 
10). Finally, the supplier of the reference must take 
reasonable steps to ensure that it is accurate and not 
misleading (principle 8). 7 
The prospective employer who requests a reference or is 
collecting personal information from someone other than 
the job applicant likewise m~ in most cases, reasonably 
believe that the request for the information has been 
authorised by the individual concerned {principle 2(2)(b) ). 
Where personal information is proposed to be collected 
from third parties without the knowledge or consent of the 
individual concerne<L that collection must be brought 
under one of the listed exceptions to principle 2. It is 
difficult to see how an exception from principle 2 could be 
made out for corporate 'headhunting'. for example, unless 
the agency reasonably believes that either "the infonna-
tion is publicly available information" (subcl (2Xa)), or 
else "non-compliance would not prejudice the interests of 
the individual concerned" (subcl {2){c)). 
Prior to the enactment of the Privacy Act, privacy interests 
in the workplace could be protected to a limited extent 
through the personal grievance provisions of the Employ-
ment Contracts Act 1991 (and the corresponding provi-
sions of prior industrial legislation). This was because 
there is a term implied into every contract of employment 
providing that the relationship between the parties is one of 
mutual trust, co-operation, and confidence, and as one 
aspect of this, fair and reasonable behavior is expected of 
every employer: Auckland Shop Employees IUW v Wool-
wonhs (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA); Mar/borough 
HarbourBoardvGoulden [1985] 2NZLR378(CA). One 
effect of the Privacy Act is that it reinforces, supplements, 
and aids in defining what constitutes fair and reasonable 
treatment by an employer, for such treatment would entail 
substantial compliance with the information privacy prin-
ciples. 
The personal grievance provisions of the Employment 
Contracts Act may be able to be invoked where there has 
been an unauthorised disclosure of personal information 
by the employer. Where the disclosure of the information 
relates to sexual matters and results in sexual harassment, 
the use or disclosure of such personal information by a 
fellow employee, customer, or client may also become the 
basis of a personal grievance under s 36. 
In the recently decided case of L v M Ltd (unreporte<L 14 
February 1994, Wellington Employment Tribunal, DE 
Hurley, WT 29/94 ), the employee, a homosexual, had been 
inadvertently •outed' by his employer. The employer had 
assured the employee, who was setting up a support group 
for gay and lesbian staff, that his identity would be kept 
confidential. but the employee's name appeared in an 
article in a company magazine compiled by an outside 
agency. Because of the subsequent harassment suffered 
by him, the employee was successful in making out a 
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personal grievance claim for sexual harassment (ss. 
27(l)(d), 29, and 36 of the Employment Contracts Act). 
Moreover, the employee also succeeded in establishing his 
claim for unjustified dismissal (s. 27(l)(a)) on the basis 
that he had been constructively dismissed: he had resigned 
from his employment because of the position of vulner-
ability in which he had been placed by his employer, and 
there were "some serious mistakes" in the way the em-
ployer dealt with the employee after the publication. In the 
end, the employee felt he had no option but to resign. The 
employee also attempted to make out a grievance under s. 
27(1)(b) of the Ac~ that the publication constituted an 
unjustified act by the employer to the disadvantage of his 
employment in that the workplace became threatening to 
him. However, the Tribunal held under its equity and good 
conscience jurisdiction that it would be unfair to hold the 
employer responsible for the unintentional publication by 
a third party, and dismissed this head of the claim. In the 
e~ the employee received compensation of $32,000, 
which included $2,000 for his having to move overseas, 
and $25,000 for humiliation and distress. 
In regard to the unsuccessful grievance alleged under s 
27 ( 1 )(b) of the Employment Contracts Ac~ it is interesting 
to compare the approach of the Employment Tribunal with 
that set out under subs 85( 4) of the Privacy Act In 
proceedings undertaken before the Complaints Review 
Tribunal pursuant to the Privacy Ac~ it is not a defence that 
an interference with the privacy of an individual "was 
unintentional or without negligence on the part of the 
defendant". The Complaints Review Tribunal, however, 
must "take the conduct of the defendant into account in 
deciding what, if any remedy, to grant". 
The personal grievance provisions of the Employment 
Contracts Act are also of use in a privacy context where 
there has been an unfair use of personal information. While 
there are no cases dealing directly with complaints about 
unfair surveillance of workers, the use to which informa-
tion gained through surveillance activities is put has been 
examined in personal grievance settings. In B W B ellis Ltd 
vCanterburyHotel, etc. Employees'IUW[l985] ACJ956 
(CA), a night cleaner whose work had deteriorated was 
surreptitiously observed by her employer while she per-
formed her duties one night The next morning the 
employer asked her to complete a schedule of work she had 
done the previous night. It was only after she had com-
pleted this schedule that the employer informed the woman 
that he had observed her, and that the schedule was 
inaccurate. The Court of Appeal held that the resulting 
dismissal was un justifed. It was procedurally unfair be-
cause the employee had been trapped into giving inaccu-
rate written answers to the employer's inquiry. The proper 
approach would have been for the employer to confront the 
worker from the outset with the fact that he had kept her 
under surveillance. 
In Northern Industrial District , etc. Storepersons'. ere 
/UOWv NathanDistribution Centre Ltd (1987) 1 NZELC 
95,478, an employee had been implicated in company 
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thefts by an Wldercover agent, but the dismissal interview 
was mishandled in that none of the detailedevidenceofthe 
undercover agent had been put to the employee for specific 
comment This led to a findin_g by the Labour Court that 
the dismissal was unjustified. g-
In the recent case of Graham v Christchurch Polytechnic 
(unreported, 14 September 1993, Christcburch Employ-
ment Court. Palmer J, CEC 48/93), the employer dis-
missed a tutor for allegedly harassing a female fellow staff 
member. In doing so, the employer relied in part upon the 
employee • s E-mail correspondence with the woman con-
cerned. The dismissed employee contended that this was 
improper and contravened the Privacy Act. Palmer J held 
that there was "an arguable case for procedural unfairness 
in this particular context" (p 25). The Privacy Act has thus 
added further scope to ways in which an employer may be 
found to have acted in a procedmally unfair manner. 
In regard to surveillance and monitoring activities, em-
ployment law has always had the potential to set limits on 
employers' surveillance practices to the extent that they 
are conducted in a manner that is not destructive of the 
relationship of trust and confidence that is supposed to 
exist between the parties, and that the results of the 
surveillance are used fairly. For example, in Pi/lay v 
Rentokil Ltd [1992] 1 ER.NZ 337. an employee's resigna-
tion was held to amount to a constructive dismissal. The 
reason for the Tnbunal 's finding was the employer's 
failure to explain why the employee was being investi-
gated following its botched attempts at surveillance (which 
included a high speed car chase!). The Emploment Tribu-
nal held that although the employer was entitled to carry 
out a surveillance of the employee, once the surveillance 
was detected by the employee, the employee 
... was entitled to know the depth of the respondent's 
suspicions and distrust so that he could see whether there 
was some reassurance he could give to clear up any 
simple misunderstanding, or whether a more deep seated 
reason lay behind the distrust An explanation, if given, 
may have gone some way to repairing the loss of 
confidence and trust caused to Mr Pillay by the respond-
ent's actions. My Pillay was also entitled to a proper 
opportunity to explain why the respondent' s apparent 
distrust of him was unfounded.9 
The Privacy Act further requires that surveillance or moni-
toring be necessary for a lawful purpose connected with 
the agency's function or activity (principle 1), and that the 
means, in the circumstances, are lawful, fair, and do not 
intrude unreasonably upon the personal affairs of the 
individual concerned (principle 4). Although principle 3 
requires that the employer take such steps (if any) as are, 
in the circumstances, reasonable to ensure that the indi-
vidual concerned is aware, inter alia, of the fact that 
infonnation is being collected, and the purpose for its 
collection, one exception is where the agency believes, on 
reasonable grounds, that "compliance would prejudice the 
purposes of the collection" (subcl 3(4)(d)). 
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Accordingly, surveillance or monitoring without an indi-
vidual's knowledge appears to be pennissible if it is 
necessary for a lawful purpose connected with the agen-
cy's function or activity (Principle 1 ), and if the means, in 
the circmnstances of the case, are not unfair or intrude to 
an unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs of the 
individual concerned (Principle 4). If the collection or use 
of personal infonnation is made in breach of these or other 
infonnation pivacy principles, and the information is 
relied upon for a decision to dismiss or discipline an 
employee, this in itself may constitute procedural unfair-
ness, as suggested by Palmer J in the Christchurch Poly-
technic case. 
The upshot of such cases as those cited above involving the 
unfair use of personal information is that there is little 
incentive for employers to use such information if in the 
end the Employment Tnbunal or Employment Court will 
not uphold the action taken in reliance on it In particular, 
employment law has long frowned upon the use of infor-
mation that is adverse to an employee before affording the 
individual concerned an opportunity to comment on it 
Thus, the employee's interest in access to and correction of 
personal information, now provided for under principles 6 
and 7 of the Privacy Act, can be viewed as having been 
indirectly promoted by employment law's concern with 
natma1 justice. 
In addition to being a human rights-type statute, the 
Privacy Act is also a freedom of information statute. Its 
effect in the employment arena is to extend to workers in 
the pivate sector the same rights in relation to personal 
information that have been enjoyed by public sector worlc-
ers under the Official Information Act 1982 and the Local 
Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. 
The Privacy Act enables employees to be proactive in 
regard to their personal information. Employees normally 
discover prejudicial information about themselves only 
after adverse action has already been taken. Principles 6 
and 7, however, enable employees to have access to and 
c<nect or annotate information about themselves held by 
their employer. Moreover, these rights of access and 
c<nection apply not only to personal information held by 
an employer, but also to information held by other entities, 
such as employment agencies, trade unions, professional 
and trade associations. and agencies in a client or contrac-
tor relationship with the employer. 
The right of access to personal information is subject to a 
number of 'good reasons· for refusing discloswe set out in 
ss 27, 28 and 29 of Pan IV of the Act However, only a few 
of these 'good reasons' are likely to arise in the ordinary 
employment context. Chief among these is s 29(l)(b), 
which provides that: 
( 1) An agency may refuse to disclose any information 
requested pursuant to principle 6 if -
. .. (b) The disclosure of the information or of informa-
tion identifying the person who supplied it, being 
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evaluative material, would breach an express or 
implied promise -
(i) Which was made to the person who supplied the 
information; and 
(ii) Which was to the effect that the information or the 
identity of the person who supplied it or both would 
be held in confidence ... 
On its face, this provision might be thought to protect 
material such as performance appraisals, references. and 
interview notes from disclosure to the individuals to whom 
they relate. 
However, s 29 (1) is framed as making provision for a 
series of permissive reasons for refusing disclosure. In the 
context of applying such a provision to public sector 
agencies, the Ombudsman has long held that this discre-
tion should be exercised in a fair and reasonable way .1 0 
Moreover. in accordance with the definition of ' evaluative 
material' in s 29(1)(3), the information must have been 
'compiled solely' for purposes relating to "determining 
the suitability. eligibility. or qualifications" of a person for 
employment, promotion or dismissal. Thus, for example, 
unsolicited complaints about an employee by a disgruntled 
client cannot be withheld under this provision; there must 
be "a common purpose in the supply and receipt of the 
information ".11 Such a common purpose, however, could 
be found where an employer requested a letter of reference 
from a referee nominated by a job applicant 
Furthermore, if the supplier of the evaluative material is 
another employee or a contractor engaged by the em-
ployer. it is unlikely that there would be an implied 
promise of confidentiality. For a promise of confidential-
ity to apply, the information must be supplied ' in reliance 
on' the promise. If the information is mrerely being 
suppled in the performance of the informant's duties, this 
is not sufficient The Ombudsman has stated that ' the 
promise must be operative in inducing the supply of 
information.' 12 That is, where evaluative material has 
been provided pursuant to a contractual duty, it is difficult 
to say that an implied promise of confidentiality is opera-
tive in motivating the provision of the information. Such 
would clearly be the case, however, where the supply of a 
job reference is gratuitous, since the promise of confiden-
tiality can easily be impliec:L and without such an under-
standing, the supply of such information would be preju-
diced, making reliance on s 29( 1 )(b) in this instance 
reasonable. 
The Privacy Act confers upon individuals a right of access 
to personal information about themselves regardless of 
whether that information was obtained before or after 1 
July 1993 (s 8(2)). Thus, employees now have access to 
material which may well be embarrassing for the employer 
to disclose. Accordingly, a number of employers appear to 
be in the process of auditing their personnel records to 
ensme that the information contained in them is accmate, 
up to date, relevant, and not misleading (Principle 8), and 
that it is not kept for longer than necessary (Principle 9). 
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As a COiullary to tbe right of access ooder Principle 6, 
individuals also have the right to seek conection of their 
personal infmnation (Principle 7). This right is connected 
witb the duty of agencies to ensure that personal infonna-
tion is accurate (Principle 8). Misleading or inaccurate 
infonnation may be relied upon. for example, where an 
employer is requested to act as a refereee; where an 
employee is seeking a loan; or in connection with superan-
nuation or health insurance. The right to seek correction of 
personal infonoation may therefore prevent adverse deci-
sions being made about the individual concerned. Moreo-
ver. an employee's personnel records may include a super-
visor's comments in relation to competency or conduct. on 
which matters an employee ought to have an opportunity 
to comment before the information is acted upon. This 
would be consistent with the requirements of natural 
justice. 
Conclusion 
The Privacy Act has ushered in a new period when employ-
ers will have to become more sensitive to privacy issues 
affecting the workplace. To that extent. at least, the 
Privacy Act serves an important consciousness-raising 
function. A threshhold question to be faced by employers 
under the privacy regime will be recognising whether or 
not an actual or potential privacy issue arises in the first 
place. 
It is submitted that the requirements of the Act are consist-
ent not only with sensible information practices, but with 
good industrial practice as well. Many of the concerns 
with which the Privacy Act deals may also be addressed by 
pre-existing employment or hmnan rights law. Accord-
ingly. the Privacy Act may be viewed as reinforcing and 
supplementing existing employment law and practices. 
particularly those which rely upon concepts of natural 
justice and fairness for their basis. 
Future research 
Overall, there is a need in New Zealand for empirical 
research into all aspects of privacy-related issues. Most of 
the information we have relates to the position overseas. 
particularly the United States. While there is a continuing 
need to monitor overseas developments, there may well be 
significant differences in attitudes, requirements, and prac-
tices between New Zealand and other developed countries, 
despite New Zealand's membership in the 'Global Vil-
lage'. 
In particular. there is a need for greater empirical research 
into cmrent information handling and privacy practices 
and policies in the workplace, with a view to arriving at a 
set of model guidelines. In addition, it would be interesting 
to determine whether or not the enacbnent of the Privacy 
Act has made any significant practical difference in the 
workplace. Other projects could usefully survey New 
Zealand attitudes towards privacy in the workplace, ten-
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sions between privacy and Equal Employment Opportuni-
ties monitoring, workplace gendez issues relating to pri-
vacy. and workplace health issues relating to privacy. 
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